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The trend toward  deregulation  and the  relatively high prices in the Florida  milk market have
increased  competition for milk  supplies between  the Florida  dairy  cooperatives  (FDCs) and
other cooperatives  like Dairymen  Incorporated and  Southern  Milk Sales.  Because of the
increased  competition in the  Florida markets,  the FDCs  may need to implement a
discriminatory  spatial pricing policy.  The discriminatory  pricing policy  allows  the FDCs to
expand their  membership by  absorbing  some of the  transportation  cost of producers  in distant
locations that would otherwise  be independent  producers  or members  of competing
cooperatives.  Spatial pricing  policies are  analyzed to determine  the effects  of discriminatory
pricing on  the blend price,  average aggregate  revenue  of cooperative  members,  and total costs
and quantity  of milk imports.  The results  of this study  show that a nondiscriminatory  pricing
policy maximizes  the cooperative  members'  blend price  and average  aggregate  revenue.
However,  if the  FDCs were able to increase the  price by  $0.50  as a result of using  spatial
price discrimination  to gain market power, spatial price  discrimination  would  maximize
average revenue  and blend price.
The federal  government  has  been involved  in the  ciation (TIDFA)  are  two groups of producers that
dairy  industry  since  1933.  Before government  in-  are currently  facing these  issues.
tervention,  the  industry  was  dominated  by  milk  The Florida milk market is a high-valued market
handlers  that behaved as  monopsonists  (Manches-  dominated  by  fluid  milk  sales.  In  1992,  the
ter  1983).  The Agricultural  Marketing  Agreement  weighted average Class  I (fluid milk products) uti-
Act of 1937 provided enabling legislation  to farm-  lization  rate  for  the  three  federal  milk  marketing
ers for establishing federal milk marketing  orders.  orders  in  Florida  was  85.7%  (Federal  Milk  Mar-
The government  encouraged  such orders  to estab-  keting  Order  1992).  The weighted  average  blend
lish  orderly  marketing  conditions  that  approxi-  price for the three federal milk marketing orders in
mated  a competitive  market  (AAEA  1986).  Mas-  Florida  in  1992  was  $15.35  per  hundredweight,
son  and  Eisenstat  (1980)  indicate  that  the move-  compared  with  $13.57  (North  Atlantic),  $12.68
ment  toward  deregulation  of  the  dairy  industry  (East  North  Central),  and  $13.13  (all  markets)
arises  from  concerns  that  the  federal  orders  and  (Federal  Milk Marketing  Order  1992).  The  com-
price support program have resulted in a marketing  bined  sales  from  four  cooperatives-FDFA,
environment  that  relies  little  on  price  discovery  TIDFA, Southern Milk Sales, and Dairymen Incor-
mechanisms  and  too  much  on  classified  pricing  porated-account  for virtually all of the milk sold
and the monopoly power of producer cooperatives.  to  twenty  Florida  processing  facilities.  Of  these
As  the  dairy  industry  becomes  less  regulated,  a  four cooperatives, FDFA and TIDFA represent ap-
primary  concern  of producers  is  the  impact  on  proximately  91.5%  of the total fluid milk sales  to
farm-level  income  of  increasing  competition  for  processors  in the Florida dairy  market; FDFA has
supply contracts in the local markets. The members  75%  of these sales and TIDFA the remaining 25%
of the Florida Dairy Farmers Association  (FDFA)  (FDFA  1992;  TIDFA  1992). In  addition to the co-
and the  Tampa Independent  Dairy Farmers  Asso-  operatives'  large  share  of  the  Florida  market,
TIDFA  and  FDFA  have  also  coordinated  milk
shipments  in  the  recent  past.  For  these  reasons,
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when consumption  patterns  are steadily increasing  Marketing Environment
(Kilmer et al.  1992),  dairy producers  are unable  to
produce an adequate supply of milk because of the
adverse  effects  of environmental  conditions.  Dur-  Federal Market Orders and Price
ing  these  months,  the  Florida  dairy  cooperatives  Support Programs
must  obtain  supplemental  milk  from  import
sources to fulfill supply contracts. For example,  in  ..  i  ic 
1992 the-  importe  o  pous of  The tools of U.S.  dairy policy are the federal  mar- 1992 the  FDCs imported  120,183,725  pounds  of 1992  the  FDCs  imported  120,183,725  pounds  of  keting  orders  and the  price  support program.  The
milk  from  sources  as  distant  as  fifteen  hundred  ketg orders  e  c  spp  program  The
marketing  orders use a classified pricing  system to
miles  from  the  Florida  market  (FDFA  1992; Tmies  from  the  Florida  markeit  ,(FDFA  1992;  •ensure  an adequate supply of fluid milk to the retail
TIDFA  1992). Within the deficit months,  approxi-  market.  Meanwhile,  the  price  support  program
market.  Meanwhile,  the  price  support  program mately 30% of the total milk imports occur in Sep-  mata  price  foor for  ra  m  or 
maintains  a price  floor for Grade B  milk,  or milk tember.  Because  of the  transportation  cost associ-  processe  ito mafactri  procts  I  processed  into  manufacturing  products.  In  1960, ated with  shipping  raw  milk, FDCs have  paid  as  eighty  federal  marketing  orders  regulated  43%  of
much T^ as^  '  $22.87  peighty  federal  marketing  orders  regulated 43%  of much as $22.87 per hundredweight for supplemen-  all  milk  marketed.  By the  end  of  1993,  approxi-
tamilk  (  e  e  al.  '  19)  ^PP  -all  milk marketed.  By the  end of  1993,  approxi-
tal milk  (Kilmer et al.  1992).  mately  70%  of  total  milk  marketings  within  the
The  trend  toward  deregulation,  the  increasing The  trend  toward  deregulation,  the  increasing  United States was  regulated by thirty-eight  federal
Florida  population  (which  increases  the  demand 
for dairy products),  and the relatively high prices in  ses  marketing  order are composed of Class I,
the Florida market have increased  competition for the Florida, ma~rket  have increased  competition for  Class II,  and  Class III  sales.  Class I sales are  rep-
milk supplies (i.e., milk producers). Because of the  milk supplies  (i.e., milk prod  ). B  e of te  resented by the percentage of total production used
increased  competition,  the  FDCs  need  to  keep increased  competition,  the  FDCs  need  to  keep  for beverage  purposes.  Soft products,  such  as  ice
prices  low  to  fluid milk  processors,  keep  returns ces  low  to  fluid  mik  processors,  keep  eturns  cream and yogurt, represent Class II sales. Class III
high to dairy farmers,  and bring producers into the high to dairy farmers,  and b.ng producers  .to  the  .milk  is manufactured  into cheese, butter, and non-
FDCs in order to satisfy the increasing  demand  in  ft dy  m  -).  T  p  a  fat  dry  milk  (III-A).  These  products  are  better the  Florida  milk  market.  This  article  focuses  on  ko  as  storae  milk  p  uct.  or  areti
known  as  storable  milk  products.  For marketing expanding the cooperative membership to meet the  orders east  of the  Rocky  Mountains  class  pces orders east  of the  Rocky  Mountains,  class  prices increasing  demand  for  dairy  products  in  Florida;  i  i  - however, in  g  the  m  hip ao  are based on the pnrice paid by unregulated proces- however,  increasing  the  FDCs'  membership  also  sors  for manufacturin  ade  milk  in  the  Minne-
affects  the  prices  charged  processors  and the  re-  sota-Wisconsin (MW)  rei  Thi  ein 
sota-Wisconsin  (M-W)  region.  This  region  rep-
turns to dairy farmers. turns  to  da~iry  farmers,  resents  a  marketing  area  where  local  production
To expand the number of producers in the FDCs,  c  t  . exceeds consumption throughout  the year.  Subse- the FDCs must go beyond Florida borders, because,  n  a 
quently,  Minnesota-Wisconsin  producers  are  a the FDCs  already have  approximately  97%  of the  quently,  M  ne  ota-Wis  ducers  are  supplemental  source  of  raw  milk  during  deficit production  in  Florida  (Cooperative  Records).  By  monts  n oter maretn  ar months  in other marketing  areas.
implementing  a  discriminatory  spatial  pricing implementing  a  discr  atory  spatial  pricing  In all marketing orders, the class price is related
policy,  the FDCs may  be able  to expand the num-  to  the  M-W  ce.  Fo 
ber of cooperative members by absorbing  some of  marketing  order's  Class  III  price  is generally  the
the transportation  cost of producers  in distant  lo-  M-W  price.  The  Class  price  is the M-W  price
cations that would  otherwise  be independent  pro- cations that  would  otherwise  be independent  pro-  plus a price differential  that usually totals $0.25 per
ducers  or  members  of  competing  cooperatives. ducers  or  members  of  competing  cooperatives,  hundredweight  (Schiek 1991).  The Class I price is
With  a  discriminatory  spatial  pricing  policy,  the  the  M-W price  plus  a Class  I  differential  that  is
FDCs  may  be  able  to  decrease  the  quantity  and  established in the federal orders. The differences  in
total cost of milk imports by expanding  their milk total cost of milk imports by expanding  their milk  price differentials  reflect the additional  costs  (i.e.,
supplies,  to increase  the total  income of producer  tn  ad  s  y  r)  transportation  and  sanitary  requirements)  associ- members,  and  to  be competitive  with  other  pro-  t  ai  Aq  i  inr members,  and  to  be  competitive  with  other  po-  ated with marketing  Grade  A fluid milk. In  1994,
ducer  cooperatives.  In this  article,  spatial pricing  th  Class  I dfferentials  f  E  Claire,  Wiscon-
policies  are  analyzed  to  determine  the  effects  of  sin  (the  geographic  center  of the  Minnesota- sin  (the  geographic  center  of the  Minnesota- discriminatory  pricing on the blend price,  average  W  s  r  , t  C  Wisconsin  supply region),  to  Chicago  and  Miami aggregate  revenue  of  cooperative  members,  and were  $1.40  and $4.18, respectively  (Federal Milk
total  costs  and  quantity  of milk  imports.  This  ar-  Marketing  Order  1994). tide will  determine  which  spatial  pricing  policy,
discriminatory  or  nondiscriminatory,  provides
more benefits  in terms of the levels  of blend price
and average aggregate revenue to the FDCs'  mem-  As of May  1995,  the M-W price is known as the Basic Formula Price
bers.  (BFP).96  April 1997  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Market Power  dependent  of  the  concentration  of dairy  coopera-
tives (Babb  1989;  Christ  1980;  Jesse  and Johnson
Since Congress passed the Capper-Volstead Act of  1985). Babb (1989) estimated over-order payments
1922,  dairy  farmers  have  been  collectively  bar-  as  a  function  of  cooperative  concentration,  pres-
gaining with milk handlers  through cooperative or-  ence of a major  cooperative in a market, price re-
ganizations.  Over  the  years,  the  membership  in  lationships  among orders,  utilization rates,  cost of
these cooperatives has increased to the point where  milk services,  product  concentration,  and  proces-
82% of all producer milk is marketed through dairy  sor  concentration.  Babb  used  cross-sectional  data
cooperatives  (Jacobson  and Cropp  1994).  The pri-  for each year  during the period  1970-87.  The re-
mary role of dairy cooperatives  is to perform mar-  suits  of Babb's  article  showed  that  the estimated
keting services for member producers.  These mar-  coefficients for  cooperative  concentration and  the
keting services include milk assembly, testing, ad-  presence of a major cooperative were generally not
vertising,  record  keeping,  market  analysis,  and,  statistically  different  from  zero.  The  impacts  of
most  important,  obtaining  supply  contracts  with  both  processor  and  cooperative  concentration  on
individual processors.  the level of over-order payments were found to be
As the  supply of milk marketed  by local  coop-  relatively  small. Variables  that did have significant
eratives increased,  milk handlers let dairy coopera-  impacts on over-order payments were the price re-
tives do their short-term  and  seasonal balancing of  lationships  among orders and the cost of raw milk
supply with demand  (Gaunmitz 1963). Some of the  services. The article revealed that over-order  pay-
services provided to the milk handlers are disposal  ments had  a positive relationship  with the cost of
of milk in excess  of fluid requirements,  arranging  milk services and the cost of milk from alternative
for an  adequate  supply of fluid milk on  a supple-  sources. Although these results do not indicate that
mental  or  continuing  basis,  and  providing  stan-  cooperative concentration does not have an impact
dardized milk by performing quality control func-  on over-order payments,  the results  do support the
tions  (Babb  1989).  For  these  services,  milk  han-  theory  that variables  related  to federal  regulations
dlers pay cooperatives  over-order payments.  Some  impact  these  payments  more  than  do  structural
have suggested that these over-order payments are  variables.
an  indication  of  cooperatives'  increasing  market
power resulting  in part from the federal milk mar-  Spatial Pricing
keting  orders  (Masson and  Eisenstat  1980).
Although  there  are  no  regulations  that  directly  As  competition  increases  in  local  markets,  coop-
benefit cooperatives,  critiques  of the  federal milk  eratives may  secure a larger milk supply by using
marketing  order  system  suggest  that  the  regula-  some  form  of  spatial  price  discrimination.  Under
tions indirectly lead to market power by preventing  the  existing  federal  milk marketing  orders,  trans-
competition  in  local  markets  (Kessel  1967).  For  portation differentials  help assure an adequate  sup-
example,  pooling  provisions  provide  larger  dairy  ply  of  fluid  grade  milk  in  local  markets.  These
cooperatives  with the opportunity to increase mar-  transportation  differentials  are  known  as  location
ket share in areas that are more competitive.  Dom-  or  zone  differentials.  Within a milk marketing  or-
inant cooperatives  that  operate in  several markets  der,  the  location differential  is  a function  of how
can  use  the  pooling  provisions  to  increase  the  far a producer  is removed  from  the  metropolitan
blend price  and  eliminate  competition  from  other  area  or base point.  The differential  increases  with
dairy  cooperatives  (Masson  and  Eisenstat  1980).  distance and reduces the blend price that is paid to
As competition  is reduced,  the dominant  coopera-  producers. The original purpose of the location dif-
tive  becomes  the  major  source  of  raw  milk  for  ferential  was  to  establish  a  supply  region  for  a
regulated  handlers  in the local  market. This  situa-  market  and to  allow processors  within  the  market
tion provides the cooperatives  with an opportunity  to purchase  milk at the  same  price,  net of  trans-
to negotiate over-order payments in excess of what  portation costs. The differentials establish a bound-
would prevail  in a competitive market.  ary  around  a marketing  area  so  that there  are  no
Masson  and Eisenstat  (1980)  argue that  once  a  price  incentives  for  producers  or  processors  lo-
dairy cooperative  is the dominant  supplier of milk  cated in other regions to compete in the  local mar-
in a region, monopoly  premiums  can be  obtained  ket  (AAEA  1986).  As  the  markets  become  more
from milk handlers because they lack a stable sup-  competitive, producer organizations  are expanding
ply of raw milk from other sources.  An alternative  markets  by  creating  price  incentives  with  spatial
theory is that the federal milk marketing orders and  pricing  policies.
the price relationships  among orders  create an  en-  The spatial pricing policies can be  nondiscrimi-
vironment where  the monopoly premiums  are  in-  natory  or  discriminatory.  The  pricing  scheme  isNubern and Kilmer  Spatial Price Discrimination  97
nondiscriminatory  when the farm price is equal  to  (1)  Gross Pool = TR =f{Qmi, Pmi, OOPmp},
the market price minus transportation cost between  where  TR  = total revenue
the farm and the  market. Spatial price discrimina- 
tion exists  when the farm price is not equal to the  operative  to milk handlers  in month
market price minus transportation cost between the  m measured in hundredweights (m =
farm  and the market. farm and  the  market.  1,... ,12,  and i  =  1,...  ,3);
A  nondiscriminatory  pricing  policy  known  as  =  p  o  Ca  i milk in m  h m;
free  on  board  (F.O.B.)  pricing  could  be  imple-  mipce  of Class  i m  in  month  m;
mented  by  the  cooperatives.  An  F.O.B.  pricing  p  nt  y  processing plant p (p  =  1,...,  10). policy  allows  each  producer  to  receive  the  same
blend  price  from  the  cooperative;  however,  pro-  Multiplying  the  quantity  and  price  variables
ducers pay  the  full  farm-to-market  transportation  generates the revenue associated with each class of
cost. The farm  price for  all producers  is equal  to  milk.  In  addition  to  the  revenue  generated  from
the blend price that is paid by the cooperative less  class  sales,  the monthly  over-order  payment  also
the full farm-to-market  transportation  cost.  contributes  to the pool. The monthly revenue  gen-
A  discriminatory  pricing  scheme  is  freight ab-  erated  from over-order  payments  is  arrived  at  by
sorption.  A cooperative  using  a freight-absorbing  multiplying the Class  I and II sales of Florida pro-
pricing  scheme will subsidize the distant producers  cessors  by the  amount of the  over-order payment.
by absorbing  some element of transportation cost.  The  mathematical  equation  that  determines  the
Discrimination  from  this  pricing  policy  comes  revenue  in the gross pool  is
from the fact that nearby producers pay more than
the full cost of transportation while distant produc-  (2)  Gross Pool =
ers receive some type of transportation subsidy. To  12  3  10  2
fund the transportation credits to distant producers,  PmQmi +  00PmpQmi 
the cooperative  can pay nearby producers  a lower  m=L  i=i  p=i  i=1
blend price or use money generated from the mem-  Before a blend price can be calculated, the gross
bers'  revenue pool. Because all cooperative  mem-  pool is adjusted by deducting the cost of fluid milk
bers  contribute  to the pool, the transportation  dis-  imports and the transportation cost associated with
counts  are  being  partially  funded by  nearby  pro-  disposing  of  surplus  milk  (exports)  produced  by
ducers.  the FDCs'  members.  Because these costs  are allo-
cated equally to all cooperative members, the gross
Empirical  Model of the Florida Dairy Industry  pool is reduced accordingly. The generalized func-
tional form of the annual  costs associated  with im-
In this  section,  an  empirical  model  of milk pro-  orts is
curement  in  Florida  is  developed.  Specifically,
conceptual  relationships  dealing  with  producers'  (3)  CMP=f{Q  P  D  HR
revenue,  milk  imports,  milk  exports,  and  spatial  op  op 
pricing are explored. To determine the average ag-  where  CMP = total cost of imports;
gregate revenue  of Florida dairy producers,  a sys-  Qmop  =  quantity of milk imported in month
tem  of equations  shows  the  step-by-step  deriva-  m from origin o to processing plant
tions  of  cooperative  members'  milk  payments.  p  in  hundredweights  (o  =  1,
This set of equations  is an accurate  representation  ..  .,  17);
of how the FDCs determine the monthly payments  Pmo  = price per hundredweight of milk im-
to member producers.  ported in month m from origin o;
The procedures  for deriving  the average  aggre-  Dop = distance  from  origin o  to process-
gate  revenue  of Florida  dairy  producers  for  each  ing plant p;
month start  with the dairy  cooperatives.  The first  HR  = hauling rate per mile, per hundred-
task  is to identify  what variables  are  used to cal-  weight  of milk;
culate  the cooperatives'  total  revenue.  The FDCs  and  the  annual cost  associated  with exports is
operate  in a system that pools the  revenue gener-
ated from its members'  total production. The gross  4  C  =f  ,  D  HR\
pool is the combined revenue  from the sale of co-  mah  ah
operative members'  production  before  any  deduc-  where  CXP = total transportation  cost of exports;
tions for the cost of imports and exports. With the  Qmah  =  quantity  of  cooperative  member
three classes of milk in federal milk marketing  or-  milk exported in month m from pro-
ders, the FDCs'  gross pool  is represented  as  duction  area a to hard  manufactur-98  April 1997  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
ing plant h in hundredweights  (a =  Because the objective of the model in this article
1, ... , 40  and  h  =  1, ... ,  19);  is  to maximize  the  average  aggregate  revenue  of
Dah = distance  from production  area a to  the FDCs' members,  the next step is to calculate a
hard manufacturing  plant h;  production  area's  gross  revenue  from milk sales.
HR =  hauling rate per mile, per hundred-  Gross revenue from milk sales  is found by  multi-
weight of milk.  plying  a  producer's  total  production  by  the  net
blend price  (equation  [9]): To develop the mathematical  equations, the gen-
eralized forms represented in equations (3) and (4)  12
are expanded such that the annual costs of imports  (9)  Gross Re  e 
and exports are presented  as  Gross Revenue  m  m
12  17  10
(5)  CMP =  3  3  (Pm  ,  + DopHR)Qmop  where NBPm  = net blend price  in month m.
m=i o=i  p=i  The final  step  needed  to  determine  the FDCs'
and  monthly payments  to  members  is  to adjust  a pro-
duction  area's  gross  revenue  for  farm-to-market
12  40  19  transportation  costs.  For the  model  developed  in
(6)  CXP = E  E  E  DahHRSQh  this article, the cooperatives  are responsible for all
m=i  a=l  h=l  farm-to-market  shipments of milk. Because of this
assumption,  each FDC subtracts  from the  produc- The  annual net pool,  or gross pool  adjusted for  assump  , ech  sutrcts  ro  the  r
the  costs of imports  and exports,  is calculated  by  g  urredby  the
subtracting equations  (5) and (6) from equation (2).  operatives  haing  division  from  shipping  the
The new equation  is  producer's  milk  from  the production  area  to  the The new equation  is processing  plant. The mathematical form  of a pro-
(7)  duction  area's  monthly  transportation  cost  to  the
12  [  3  10  2  processing  plants is
Net pool =  PmQmi + E  OPmpQm  i  0
m=i  iL_  p=l  i=l
=  17  10  (10)  TPma =  ZONapQm  + PUm 33p+ap=i
- (Pmo + DopHR)Qmop=l
o=1 p=l  BASma  -DISma,
40  19
3  DahHRQah - TSB  where TPma  =  production area's monthly farm-to-
a=l  h=l  market transportation  cost;
where  SBm  =  the  transportation  cost  (subsidy)  ZONa  = transportation charge  per hundred-
above  $1.284  per  hundredweight  of  milk  not  weight  of milk  from  production
charged  to  individual milk producers  who  have  a  area a to processor p;
transportation  cost  from  farm  to  processor  in ex-  Qmap  =  quantity  of cooperative  member
cess  of $1.284.  The $1.284  is a value determined  milk in month m shipped from pro-
by the  cooperatives.  If a producer has  transporta-  duction area a to processing plant p
tion costs higher  than  $1.284  per hundredweight,  in  hundredweights;
the producer receives  a subsidy for the difference.  PUma = total  pickup  charge  at production
The value  of  the  subsidy  is  determined  with  the  area a in month  m;
model.  BASma  = total base charge at production area
When computing a per hundredweight net blend  a in month m;
price,  the revenue in the net pool is divided by the  DISma = total volume discount at production
sum of all cooperative  members'  monthly produc-  area  a in month m.
tion.  On an annual  basis, the net blend  price is  A production area's milk check is the total value
of monthly  production  net of  transportation  cost.
12  e^  40^  The  objective  of  this  model  is  to  maximize  the
(8)  Net Blend Price = Net Pool/3  ,Qma,  aggregate  value  of cooperative  members'  milk
m=l  a=l  checks for the  1992  calendar year. By subtracting
where Qma =  quantity of member milk production  equation  (10)  from  equation  (9),  the  annual  re-
available  at  production  area  a  in  ceipts  (i.e.,  milk check)  for a production  area are
month m  in hundredweights.  obtained (equation  [11]).Nubern and Kilmer  Spatial Price Discrimination  99
(11)  Milk checka =  (17)  Qmap,  Qmop,  Qmah  - 0,
12  _  10
QmaNBP m - ZONpQm  a p where AAR  =  average  aggregate revenue of coop-
m=L  p=  erative members;
)~,.~  · · i]Dmp  = demand  in  month m  of processing
+ PUma + BASa - DISma  plant p in hundredweights;
Cmh  =  capacity  of  hard  manufacturing
plant  h  in  month  m  in  hundred-
The  objective  function  of the  model  is  devel-  weights;
oped by  replacing the NBPm in equation (11)  with  Sm  = available  supply  from  origin  o  in
equation  (8)  and  summing  equation  (11)  over the  month  m  in hundredweights.
forty production  areas. The final  adjustment  is re-  The  decision  variables  in  the  model  are  Qma,
placing  Qmi  in equation  (7)  with  Qmop,  and Qmah  The model  is designed  to maxi-
Qm1p = URm(Q0  + Q  ));  mize  the  average  aggregate  revenue of producers Qmlp  mp(Qmap 
+ mop) ;  * * by minimizing  the assembly cost of milk procure-
Qm2p = (1 - URmp)(Qmap + Qmop);  ment. The procurement of milk involves  (1) trans-
porting  milk from  the  farm to  the  processors,  (2)
Qm3h = Qmah,  purchasing  supplemental  milk from  the  least  ex-
where  URmp = Class  I utilization rate in month m  pensive  import source  during deficit  months,  and
•eeat  processor p.  rt  imo  (3) disposing  of milk in  the  surplus  months.  The
model is equally concerned with activities (e.g., the
The  objective  function  and  the  constraints  cost of supplemental milk and the net revenue from
needed to complete the model are illustrated below  export sales) that affect the value of the blend price
in equations  (12)  through (17).  as well as activities (e.g., intrastate milk flows) that
.(12)  Maximize  AAR  =  affect  individual  production  areas'  revenues.  Be-
12  40  x  17  10  cause  all production  areas  are linked  to each  pro-
2v  ,,  +  0op  cessing  and manufacturing  plant,  the  model  de-
a  - ((Qmap + Qmop) (0  mp  termines  simultaneously  the optimal interstate  and
intrastate  flows  of  milk  for  Florida  cooperative
+ (URmPml + (1 - URmp) Pm 2))  members.
19QpPmo  D  HR  m  Pm  Equation (13) maintains that the quantity of milk
-Qmop(mo+ DopHR))+  Qmah(Pm3  supplied  by  Florida  cooperative  members  plus
1o  supplemental milk obtained from import sources is
- DahHR) - SB  -—QmapZONa  equal  to  the processor's  monthly  demand  for raw
- map  ap  milk.  The demand  for raw  milk  is an  exogenous
variable  whose  value  is  consistent  with  monthly
-PUma  - BASma + DISma  shipments  of FDCs  in  1992 (see below  for an  ex-
planation  of  the  data  and  other  exogenous  vari-
ables). Equation (14) ensures that the shipments of
milk  from  a  production  area  to  a  processor  in
40  17  Florida plus milk supplied to manufacturing plants
E  Qmap +  E  Qmop = Dmp  p = 1, ... 10  in other states by FDCs are equal to the total quan-
a=1  o=1  tity of milk available  from  a production  area.  Es-
sentially,  this  equation  requires  that  uses  equal
(14)  sources  at the farm level. The supply  of milk from
1o  19  production areas is also an exogenous variable that
Qmap +  Qmah = Qma  a = 1, ... ,40  varies across months and corresponds to  1992 pro-
p=l  h=l  duction data.
Equation (15) recognizes  that the manufacturing
40  plants have  limited  capacities;  therefore,  the  total
(15)  Qmh  Cm  h= 1 ... 19  quantity of milk shipped from production  areas to
a=l  a manufacturing plant must be less than or equal to
the plant's monthly manufacturing  capacity. Equa-
10  tion (16)  is  a supply constraint. Because milk im-
(16)  7,  Qmop <  Sm,  o = 1, . .. ,  17  ports  are limited  during  the  deficit months,  equa-
p=i  tion  (16)  constrains  the amount  of milk  shipped100  April 1997  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
from  an  import  source  to  a  processing  plant  in  The  FDCs'  alternative  to  freight  absorption  is
Florida. The supply of milk from an import  source  F.O.B.  pricing.  In  the  F.O.B.  pricing  model
is  an  exogenous  variable  whose  value  is  deter-  (FOBPM), no production area receives  a transpor-
mined with  1992  data supplied by the FDCs.  The  tation  subsidy. Because  there  is no  transportation
final  constraint,  equation  (17),  is  a nonnegativity  subsidy, the market boundary of the FDCs  is com-
constraint  for  the  value  of the  unknown  decision  pressed  to  reflect  the  assumed  market  boundary
variables.  before  the  policy  of  spatial  price  discrimination.
Without  a transportation  subsidy,  the  authors  as-
sume that  the seven production  areas identified in
Alternative  Spatial Pricing Scenarios  the  FAPM  would  no  longer  be  members  of  the
FDCs. Hence,  the FDCs represent forty production
According to industry representatives of the FDCs,  areas  in the FAPM and thirty-three production  ar-
the objective of the organizations  is to keep returns  eas  in the  FOBPM.  By removing the  hauling rate
high  to  dairy  farmers.  To  accomplish  this objec-  cap  and shrinking the market boundary,  the effects
tive,  the  FDCs  may  need  to  expand  the  market  of freight absorption  can be compared with results
boundary  by  using  spatial price  discrimination  in  from  an F.O.B.  pricing  policy  that  approximates
the form of freight absorption. With this article, the  marketing conditions before  spatial price discrimi-
effects of spatial price discrimination on the blend  nation.
price,  the  average  aggregate revenue  of members,
and the total costs and quantity of milk imports and
exports  are analyzed. The model developed  in the  Data Requirements
previous  section is used to compare  the results  of
two pricing  scenarios: freight absorption  and non-  Most of the data needed  to conduct  the study were
discriminatory  spatial pricing in the form of F.O.B.  collected from the Florida Dairy Farmers Associa-
pricing.  The  differences  in  the  empirical  models  tion, Tampa Independent Dairy Farmers, Southern
for the two  scenarios  are discussed  below.  Milk Sales,  and Dairymen Incorporated. The com-
In the freight absorption pricing model (FAPM),  bined  sales  from these  organizations  account  for
the FDCs expand  their  market boundary  by  pro-  virtually all  of the milk that is  sold to processors
viding a transportation subsidy to distant producers  within  the Florida  milk market.  The input for the
located on the market boundary.  The transportation  model requires  monthly data collected over a one-
subsidy  is implemented  through a farm-to-market  year  time  span.  Because  the  1992  calendar  year
hauling  rate  cap.  The  hauling  rate  cap  places  an  provided the most recent data, this year was chosen
upper bound  on how  much  the FDCs  will charge  as the  time period for the  study. The specific  data
members  for  farm-to-market  transportation  cost.  requirements  are  associated  with production, pro-
The current hauling rate cap is set by the FDCs  at  cessors, manufacturing  plants, import sources, and
$1.284 per hundredweight.  To determine if a pro-  transportation cost.
duction area qualifies  for  a subsidy, the transpor-
tation cost calculated in equation (10) is divided by  Production  Areas and Supply
a production area's total monthly production. If the
per  hundredweight  farm-to-market  transportation  To establish a production  area for the  model, pro-
cost  is  greater  than  $1.284,  the  production  area  duction data on a per farm basis was collected from
receives a subsidy for the difference. After the eli-  the  FDCs.  The  only  guideline  for  establishing  a
gible  production  areas  are  identified,  the  model  production  area  is that  each area contains three  or
determines  the total  cost of the freight absorption  more  producers.  Production  areas  usually  corre-
pricing policy by summing the values  of each sub-  spond  with  a  single  county.  In  situations  where
sidy. The total cost of the freight absorption  policy  several counties are combined to form a single pro-
is then  subtracted from  the FDCs'  net pool (equa-  duction  area,  the  county  with  the  largest  annual
tion  [7])  before  a blend price is  calculated.  production  will contain the geographical  center of
The  FAPM  identified  seven  production  areas  that production area. The combined  production of
that  received  transportation  subsidies  throughout  FDFA and TIDFA  members  results  in  forty pro-
1992. With the exception of Clay County, Florida,  duction areas.
all production areas receiving a transportation  sub-
sidy were located in the Florida panhandle or south  Marketing Areas and Demand
Georgia. The authors assume that these seven pro-
duction areas are members of the FDCs because of  Specific locations in Florida are designated  as mar-
the freight absorption pricing policy.  keting areas,  which represent one  or more proces-Nubern and Kilmer  Spatial Price Discrimination  101
Table 1.  Federal Milk Marketing Order Prices for Florida, 1992 (dollars  per hundredweight)
Class  I  ClaII
Order 6  Order  12  Order  13  Florida Market  M-W
January  16.06  16.36  16.66  12.25  11.71
February  15.68  15.98  16.28  11.95  11.21
March  15.29  15.59  15.89  11.09  10.98
April  14.79  15.09  15.39  11.16  11.46
May  14.56  14.86  15.16  12.12  12.06
June  15.04  15.34  15.64  13.07  12.46
July  15.64  15.94  16.24  12.46  12.59
August  16.04  16.34  16.64  12.67  12.54
September  16.17  16.47  16.77  13.17  12.28
October  16.12  16.42  16.72  12.56  12.05
November  15.86  16.16  16.46  11.87  11.84
December  15.63  15.93  16.23  11.62  11.34
SOURCE:  Federal  Milk Marketing  Order  1992.
sors.  The  Florida  market  contains  ten  marketing  Export Alternatives
areas.  The monthly  demand  for raw  milk at  each
marketing  area varies  across months, but the total  The  total  number  of  export  alternatives  in  the
demand  for each  processor  is fixed  to correspond  model is  nineteen. These nineteen locations  repre-
with  the actual  quantity  of milk processed  during  sent  viable export  alternatives  for the  Florida  co-
1992. The demand  at  all marketing  areas  is  satis-  operatives.  All  plants  received  at  least  100,000
fied by milk shipments from  cooperative members  pounds of milk in 1992. Any location that received
and  imported  milk  that  is  marketed  through  the  less than 100,000 pounds is not considered a viable
cooperatives,  export alternative. Monthly processing capacity for
The prices that are paid by marketing areas cor-  manufacturing  plants, which are the types of plants
respond  to the  class  prices of Federal  Milk  Mar-  that received most of the FDCs' exported milk, are
keting Orders 6,  12,  and  13. Table  1 lists the  1992  fixed at  levels that coincide  with the  total amount
prices that were paid in each of these federal milk  of  exports  shipped to  that  plant  by  FDCs  during
marketing  orders. The Class  I price that a market-  1992.
ing  area  pays  is  dependent on  the  location of the  The  prices  at  export  plants  are  based  on  the
marketing area. The Class II prices for producers in  monthly M-W price that is illustrated in table 1. To
the  Florida market  are the  same  across marketing  arrive  at the  model's  monthly  Class  III  price,  the
orders. Also included in table 1 are the M-W (Class  M-W is adjusted according to the guidelines in the
III)  prices for  1992.  contract between  Florida  cooperatives  and  Dairy-
Marketing areas also pay an over-order payment  men Incorporated.2 For reasons  of confidentiality,
on all Class  I and II milk that is processed  at that  the  contract  specifications  are  not outlined in  the
particular  location.  The  value  of  the  over-order  article.
payment  is  an  exogenous  variable  that  differs
across marketing areas and  months. For each mar-  Import Sources
keting  area,  the monthly  average  over-order  pay-
ment  is  based  on  the  actual  payments  made  by ment  is  based  on  the  actual  payments  made  by  The model  includes  seventeen  import  sources  lo-
individual  processors  in  1992.  Because  of confi-  ced thouhou  he  nte  Se.  Ech  import
cated throughout  the  United  States.  Each  import dential data, the  over-order payment  is an average  . met
source represents a location in which supplemental payment per hundredweight  of Class  I and II milk  milk was obtained  by Florida cooperatives  in 1992. milk was obtained by Florida cooperatives in 1992.
from processors  located in a particular marketing from  processors  located in  a particular  m  ng  The  quantity  of  milk  available  at  each  import
e  final exe  s  variabe  a  iated  wih  source  is determined by using the same procedures The  final  exogenous  variable  associated  with outlined  above  when assigning processing  capaci-
processors is the utilization rate. A processor's uti-  ties  at export facilities.  The price that the coopera-
lization  rate  determines  the  quantity  of milk that  es  st  p  fr he  ppeental mk i  deter-
tives must pay for the supplemental  milk is deter- will be processed into Class I and II products.  The
actual utilization  rates for each  processor are used
to determine  a marketing  area's weighted  average  The  contract  price  applies  to milk  that is shipped  to plants  that  are
Class I and II utilization rates. The utilization rates  owned by Dairyman Inc.  or shipments to plants in  which Dairyman Inc.
vary  by marketing  area and month.  acts  as the broker for  Florida cooperatives.102  April 1997  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
mined  by  using the  actual  prices  reported  by  the  volume discount. With the FDFA's current pricing
FDCs.  policy,  a  production  area's  per-hundredweight
transportation cost cannot exceed the cooperatives'
Transportation  Cost  predetermined  hauling  rate  cap  of  $1.284.  If the
farm-to-market  transportation  cost  is  greater  than
e final  da  r  ent p  inf  n on  $1.284  per hundredweight,  the production  area re- The final data requirement provides information on
ceives  a subsidy to pay the  additional transporta- transportation cost. The two types of transportation  ceves  a subsidy  to pay the additional  transprta tion  costs  above  the  cap  of  $1.284  per  hundred- cost in the model are farm-to-market  transportation  on  c  s  bove  the cp of $.4  per hnde weight.  This  subsidy  is  given  to  compensate  the cost  and  transportation  cost  associated  with  im-  ign  o  o  an
cooperative  members  living  in north Florida  and ports and exports.  To  calculate  any  transportation  ooeratie  e  er  north  Florida  and
south Georgia when their milk is hauled to buyers cost, the  following  distance  variables  are  needed:  north  and  w  est  of Florida  be  ause  FDFA  has a ^  ,i  ^  ,  .\  *  north  and  west  of Florida  because  FDFA  has  a (1) production  area to marketing  area, (2)  produc-  of  e  a  surplus of milk. TIDFA does not have a transpor- tion  area  to  export  alternatives,  and  (3) import 
source  to processing  plant.  The  origin and  desti-
nation  points  of  these  distance  variables  are  de-
termined  by  using the  geographical  center  of  the
production  areas  and  the  exact  location  of  the  Results
processors,  manufacturers,  and  import  sources.
AUTOMAP is used to determine the exact distance  The  results  of  the  FAPM  and  FOBPM  are  pre-
for  all  production  areas,  marketing  areas,  export  sented in table 2. In this table, the annual results for
alternatives,  and import sources.  1992 are compared for each pricing policy. Differ-
Along with the mileage, the additional  informa-  ences  in  the  average  aggregate  revenue,  blend
tion needed  to calculate the  transportation cost  on  price,  production, cost of imports  and exports, and
imports  and exports is a hauling rate. The hauling  quantity  of imports and exports are used to explain
rate  on  imports  and  exports  is  $2.00  per  loaded  the  results  of the  nondiscriminatory  and  discrimi-
mile  with  a load  of milk  equal  to  475  hundred-  natory  pricing  scenarios.
weights  (FDFA 1992;  TIDFA  1992). Dividing the  The  first variable  in  table  2  is  the  average  ag-
$2.00  per  loaded  mile  by  475  gives  a  figure  of  gregate  revenue,  or mailbox  price.  The  objective
.0042105,  which  represents the  per mile, per hun-  function  of  the  model  (equation  [12])  maximizes
dredweight hauling charge for imports and exports.  the  average  aggregate revenue of all the  members
This value  remains  constant across months.  in the FDCs. The aggregate revenue in the model is
The  hauling  rate  schedule  used  to  calculate  equivalent  to the  sum of FDCs'  payments  to pro-
farm-to-market  transportation  cost  is  a  modified  ducers in 1992. Dividing the  aggregate revenue by
version  of  FDFA's  hauling  rate  schedule.  Many  the total milk supply  yields the average  aggregate
aspects  of  FDFA's  hauling  schedule  are  used  to  revenue,  or  mailbox  price,  for  members  of  the
calculate the production-area-to-market  transporta-  FDCs. The FAPM and the FOBPM result in mail-
tion cost. The levels of the base, zone, and pick-up  box prices of $15.50  and $15.76, respectively.  The
charges are obtained directly from the hauling rate  nondiscriminatory  pricing  model  has  an  annual
schedule provided by FDFA. The production-area-  mailbox price that is $0.26 higher than the average
to-market transportation  cost for a production area  mailbox price  paid  to  producers  after  expanding
is  calculated  by  adding  together  the  total  base,  the market boundary.
zone, and pick-up charges  and subtracting the total  The  ranking  of  the  net  blend  price  from  each
Table  2.  Annual Results  of FAPM and FOBPM
Spatial  Models
FAPM  FOBPM  Difference
Variables
Mailbox  price  (AAR per cwt.)  15.50  15.76  (0.26)
Net blend price ($  per cwt.)  16.23  16.48  (0.25)
Total  quantity imported  (cwt.)  196,581.17  895,336.36  (698,755.19)
Total  cost of imports  ($)  3,952,000  18,506,500  (14,554,500)
Total  quantity exported  (cwt.)  1,253,195.23  223,960.06  1,029,235.10
Total cost  of exports  ($)  2,262,306.48  308,133.64  1,954,172.80
Total production  (cwt.)  27,715,521  25,439,223  2,276,298Nubem and Kilmer  Spatial Price Discrimination  103
scenario  is  also  consistent with  the results  of the  Table  3.  Results of Surplus and Deficit
mailbox  price.  The  FOBPM  has  an  annual  net  Months for FAPM and FOBPM
blend  price  of  $16.48  per  hundredweight.  This
price  is  $0.25  higher  than the  net blend  price  of  FAPM
$16.23 in the FAPM.  If the average  mailbox price  Surplus  Months  Deficit Months
and  the  annual  net  blend  price  are  considered,
F.O.B.  pricing  is  the  optimum  spatial  pricing  VaRiables  Malbox  16.00 (AAR per cwt.)  15.20  16.00
policy if the primary objective of the cooperative  is  Net blend price
to  maximize  the  average  aggregate  revenue  of  ($  per cwt.)  15.88  16.80
members  by increasing  the  net blend price.  Total production  (cwt.)  17,605,924  10,109,597
The FAPM reduces the cost and quantity of milk  FOBPM
imports into Florida. On an annual basis, the FAPM  Surplus  Months  Deficit Months
results in total imports of 196,581.17 hundredweights
at a cost of $3,952,000  ($20.10 per hundredweight).  Variables  Mailbox  price
The FOBPM imports 895,336.36 hundredweights  of  (AAR per cwt.)  15.74  15.81
Net blend  price
milk at a total cost of $18,506,500  ($20.67 per hun-  ($  per cwt.)  16.42  16.57
dredweight).  These results are consistent with the dif-  Total  production (cwt.)  16,138,652  9,300,571
ferences  in the two models. In the FAPM, the FDCs
represent a larger milk supply. Because of the larger
supply  of local production,  the cooperatives  import  terns  are consistent with the results of the FOBPM.
less  milk during  the deficit months.  In  contrast,  the  The  average  aggregate  revenue,  net blend  price,
market boundary is compressed  in the FOBPM,  and  and  total production  are  compiled  for the  surplus
the  FDCs represent  only thirty-three  production  ar-  and deficit months and reported in table 3 for both
eas.  The  decrease  in  local  production  results  in  a  the  FAPM  and the FOBPM.
larger  quantity of milk imports.  With  table  3, the results  of the  FAPM and the
As  expected,  the  FAPM  reduces  the  cost  and  FOBPM  can be  compared  on the basis  of surplus
quantity  of  imports  at  the  expense  of exported  and  deficit  months.  In  the  surplus  months,  the
milk.  The  FOBPM  exports  223,960.06  hundred-  FAPM  results in  a mailbox price  of $15.20  and  a
weights of milk at a total cost of $308,133.64. The  net blend price  of $15.88  per hundredweight.  Re-
average  transportation  cost  of  exports  in  the  suits from  the same  months  in the  FOBPM  show
FOBPM  is  $1.38  per  hundredweight.  Because  of  that both the mailbox price and the net blend price
the  larger  supply  of local  production,  the FAPM  are higher, $15.74 and $ 16.42, respectively. In the
increases  the  total  cost  and  quantity  of  exported  surplus months, the nondiscriminatory spatial pric-
milk.  The  FAPM  exports  1,253,195.23  hundred-  ing policy increases both the mailbox price and the
weights  of milk at a cost of $2,262,306.48,  which  net  blend  price  by  $0.54  per  hundredweight.  As
results in an average  transportation cost of exports  expected,  the  results  are  opposite  in  the  deficit
of $1.81  per hundredweight.  Notice  that  the  opti-  months.  By  increasing  the  local  supply  of  milk,
mum pricing strategy, F.O.B. pricing,  results in the  which  reduces milk imports  in the deficit months,
lower  cost  of  exports  and  the  higher cost  of  im-  the  FAPM  increases  both  the  mailbox  price
ports. In contrast, a policy of spatial price discrimi-  ($16.00)  and  the  net  blend  price  ($16.80).  The
nation results in the higher cost of exports and the  FOBPM results in a mailbox price of $15.81  and a
lower  cost of imports. Based on these results, the  net blend  price  of $16.57.  These prices  are $0.19
outcome  of the  study appears  to be dependent  on  and $0.23,  respectively,  less  than the correspond-
which  pricing  strategy results  in the lower cost of  ing prices in the FAPM. The results of the deficit
exported  milk.  These  results  are  consistent  with  months  indicate  that  a policy  of spatial price  dis-
what Nubern  and Kilmer  (1995)  found  in a study  crimination maximizes  the average  aggregate rev-
of  alternative  procurement  systems  for  Florida  enue  of members if the FDCs are importing  milk.
dairy farmers.  The  study  indicates  that  the  optimum  pricing
Given the apparent relationship between the op-  strategy  is  F.O.B.  pricing.  F.O.B.  pricing  maxi-
timum  pricing  strategy and  the transportation  cost  mizes the average aggregate revenue and results in
of exports,  table  3  illustrates the  changes  in aver-  the  lower cost of exports.  The FDCs export milk
age aggregate  revenue  and net blend price for sur-  seven months out of twelve. Because of the loss in
plus  and deficit months. Traditionally,  the surplus  revenue associated with disposing of surplus milk,
months  in  the  Florida  market  are  December  a freight  absorption  pricing  strategy  that  expands
through  June  and  the  deficit  months  are  July  the  market  boundary  is  not  the  optimum  pricing
through November.  These  import and export pat-  policy for the  FDCs. Currently,  the benefits  asso-104  April 1997  Agricultural  and Resource Economics Review
ciated  with  freight  absorption  are  not  enough  to  aggregate  revenue  per  cooperative  member  are
offset the additional  cost of exporting milk.  If the  less  than  what  would  occur  if  all  production
marketing  environment changes  and the  FDCs in-  areas were paying the full farm-to-market  transpor-
crease  the  total  quantity  of milk  shipped  into  tation  cost  (i.e.,  F.O.B.  pricing  model);  however,
Florida, the results indicate  that a policy  of freight  a policy of spatial price discrimination  is optimum
absorption  would be  effective  in this situation.  in  the  deficit  months.  By  expanding  the  market
boundary  and  representing  a  larger  supply  of
local  production,  the  FDCs  are  able  to  reduce
Sensitivity  Analysis  the cost and quantity of imported milk. The disad-
vantage  to  this  pricing  policy  is  that  the  cost
In both spatial  pricing  models,  the prices paid by  and  quantity  of  exports  are  increased.  For  these
milk  handlers  are  fixed.  If  prices  remain  un-  reasons,  the  FAPM  is  the  optimum  policy  in
changed as the FDCs expand the market boundary,  the  deficit  months  and  the  FOBPM  is  the  opti-
the  study  shows  that the  FOBPM  maximizes  the  mum  policy  in  the  surplus  months.  Because  the
average aggregate revenue per hundredweight. The  FOBPM maximizes  the  annual  average  aggregate
problem  with  this  solution  is  that  the  current  revenue  per  member,  the  results  appear  to  be
FAPM does not  account  for changes  in price  that  dependent  on  which  pricing  policy  reduces
may result from  an  increase  in bargaining  power.  the costs of exported  milk.  If the market environ-
In the FAPM, the FDCs may increase their market  ment changes  so that the FDCs are importing milk
power by expanding the market boundary.  By con-  most of the year, a policy of spatial price discrimi-
trolling  a  larger  supply  of local  milk production,  nation  could  maximize  the  members'  mailbox
the FDCs may bargain for higher prices if they are  price.
successful  in  protecting  the Florida  market  from  A nondiscriminatory  pricing  policy  maximizes
alternative  milk supplies.  the  cooperative  members'  annual  blend  price
Assume that  in the  FAPM  the FDCs  have suf-  and annual  average  aggregate  revenue.  However,
ficient  market power  so that they can bargain  for  if  the  FDCs  were  able  to  increase  the  proces-
higher prices. Since the FAPM already maximizes  sor  price  by  at  least  $0.50  using  spatial  price
the  average  aggregate  revenue  in  the  deficit  discrimination  to  gain  market  power,  spatial
months,  an  assumption  is  made  that  the  FDCs  price  discrimination  would  maximize  average
would bargain for higher prices only in the surplus  aggregate revenue  and blend  price.  There may  be
months  (December  through June). Through sensi-  other economic  variables  (i.e.,  interregional  price
tivity  analysis,  scenarios  that have price  increases  relationships, competition between the two Florida
in the  surplus  months  are  created.  Price increases  cooperatives,  alternative  supplies from other coop-
are  incorporated into the  model through  the over-  eratives)  that  would determine  whether the FDCs
order payment.  could bargain for a higher processor price. Further
To determine at what point the FAPM becomes  research  could  employ  game  theory  to determine
the optimal solution, the  over-order payment is re-  the impact on the results from the competition be-
duced  parametrically  from  an  initial  value  of  tween  the  two  Florida  cooperatives.  This  article
$1.00.  Through  gradual  reductions  in  price,  the  assumes  that the current competitive  environment
model  showed  that  a  $0.50  increase  in  the over-  would  continue.  Furthermore,  contestable  market
order payment  is necessary  for  the FAPM  to be-  theory could be  employed to determine  the impact
come  the  optimal  solution.  With a $0.50  increase  on the results from the cooperatives outside Florida
in an  over-order premium, the FAPM has mailbox  that would like to supply milk to Florida. An analy-
and net blend prices of $15.77  and $16.49, respec-  sis  of  how  these  issues  affect  the  cooperatives'
tively. These results are $0.01 higher than those of  spatial pricing strategy  is beyond the  scope of this
the FOBPM (table 2). The results of the sensitivity  article.
analysis show that the FAPM  is the optimum sce-
nario  only  if the FDCs  are  able  to  bargain  for a
price  increase  of approximately  $0.50  in the sur- 
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